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Abstract
To explain why pre-play communication increases cooperation in games,
one refers to a) strategic causes such as eﬃcient communication or reputa-
tion eﬀects, and b) changes in the utilities due to social processes. Hitherto
experimental support for both explanations is mixed and confounded. Our
experimental design eliminates all strategic factors and allows to focus on
the eﬀects of communication processes. We clearly ﬁnd social eﬀects, but
none of revealed anonymity or salient communication. The social processes
invoked are very heterogeneous but not irregular for diﬀerent communica-
tors.
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Face-to-face communication before starting to play a game is usually eﬀective in
inducing cooperation between players (Dawes, 1990; Frohlich and Oppenheimer,
1998). In bargaining experiments, the implications are more equal splits and
therefore fewer disagreements (Roth, 1995; Schmidt and Zultan, 2005).
One explanation views the communication eﬀects as resulting from changes
in utilities, triggered by acquaintance with or attributes of others. Examples
are group identity or empathy.1 Another explanation sees pre-play communica-
tion eﬀects caused by strategic issues. Since verbal and non-verbal channels of
communication eliminate anonymity, players confront something like a repeated
game where their reputation is at risk, so that promises, threats or coordination
proposals become strategically meaningful.
Roth (1995) labelled these explanations the Uncontrolled Social Utility Hy-
pothesis and the Communication Hypothesis. He describes an ultimatum bar-
gaining experiment with two treatments: in the ﬁrst, unrestricted pre-play
face-to-face communication was allowed, and in the second, communication was
restricted to non-game topics. Since the restricted treatment was as successful
as the unrestricted communication treatment in inducing nearly equal splits,
the Communication Hypothesis was rejected. Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann
(2003) found, however, for 4-person public goods experiments that mere iden-
tiﬁcation of others via video screen does not enhance contributions, and thus
deny explanation by Social Utility.
In our view, both interpretations are questionable. Possible strategic eﬀects
of face-to-face communication are not fully excluded in the restricted com-
munication treatment, since strategic eﬀects of non-verbal communication and
reputation concerns are still present. More generally, the predictions of the
two main hypotheses are inherently confounded, as features of full face-to-face
communication may enhance aﬀective social factors, but also allow for strategic
communication and reputation concerns.2 Furthermore, social utility commu-
nication theories require more than pure visual identiﬁcation to stimulate social
processes.3
1See Dawes (1990) for experiments on group identity and cooperation.
2A recent replication of the experiment by Schmidt and Zultan (2005) incorporated the
strategy method. The authors show that responders’ strategies diﬀerentiate the two treat-
ments, as responders become even less cooperative in the unrestricted treatment than in the
no communication treatment.
3The pre-play audio-conference in Brosig et al. (2003), although increasing contributions
in the early rounds of the game, did not have the same eﬀect as the full face-to-face communi-
cation treatments, an observation that can be easily attributed to social utility explanations.
2To provide a less biased test of the Uncontrolled Social Utility Hypothesis
our experimental scenario excludes all strategic aspects. Thus we can more
safely interpret any resulting eﬀects of communication as being social. More-
over, we study discrimination between diﬀerent receivers based on (means of)
communication.
Our workhorse is a three-person dictator game. One of three players is the
dictator who can allocate a positive amount of money, the ”pie”, between the
three. We shall call the other two players ”dummies”, as they have no strategic
inﬂuence, and can merely hope that the dictator may be generous.
In our experiment, communication is one-sided: Only dummies can talk to
the dictator, whose reputation is therefore not at risk. Furthermore, communi-
cation is without strategic impact since the only conveyors of communication
are the powerless dummies. The use of video-interfaces enables us to manipulate
communication channels. We assume that face-to-face communication eﬀects
are not restricted to actual face-to-face encounters, but can also be attained by
video-mediated communication (Brosig et al., 2003).
Our three treatments include a no-communication baseline, a video-only
treatment where both dummies are seen, but not heard by the dictator, and
an audio-visual treatment where additionally one dummy is heard, but not
the other. We thereby hope to test three distinct social mechanisms for the
Uncontrolled Social Utility Hypothesis:
• Revealed anonymity hypothesis: One may feel guilty when taking
advantage of others where such feelings are reduced when there are social
buﬀers between the actor and the target. Therefore, without anonymity
dictator participants become less opportunistic, and visual exposure (in-
cluding body gestures, facial expressions) of a dummy will prompt dictator
generosity.
• Social communication hypothesis: Mere exposure may not be the
main or the only factor involved. Rather, it is the combination of lifted
anonymity and the audio channel with its phonetic and linguistic content
which induces empathy towards the communicator. Allocations to the
other dummy should not be aﬀected.
• Salient considerations hypothesis: During pre-play communication
the dummy may emphasize considerations in her favor. For example, by
stressing fairness considerations she may make them more salient for the
dictator. This eﬀect should also increase the other dummy’s share.
3Although the last hypothesis is somewhat related to the Communication
Hypothesis discussed above, it claims a purely social eﬀect, as strategic issues
are not present in the game.
According to our experimental results donations to dummies increase when
adding communication channels from the baseline over the visual to the audio-
visual treatment. On the aggregate level, these results are only signiﬁcant for
dictators and talking dummies when comparing the audio-visual to the base-
line treatment. Discrimination between dummy pairs is higher in the audio-
visual treatment than in the other treatments, although we ﬁnd no evidence
for discrimination within dummy pairs at the aggregate level. Social ratings of
dummies show high correlations with generosity towards them and discriminate
dummies in the visual and audio-visual treatment. When looking at speciﬁc
dummy pairs, results are quite heterogenous but not irregular, suggesting diﬀer-
ent social processes to be involved. Our results do not corroborate the revealed
anonymity nor the salient considerations hypothesis. The Uncontrolled Social
Utility Hypothesis can thus be reﬁned to the Social Communication Hypothesis.
Purely social factors play a role, at least when strategic issues are absent.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we explain our experimental
design and procedures in detail. Section 3 presents our results on average data,
evaluations and speciﬁc dummy pairs, while Section 4 discusses our results.
2 Experimental design and procedures
In the 3-person dictator game, dictator X can distribute an uneven ”pie” of
p = 17.00 Euros between himself and two dummies Y and Z. The possible
allocations (x,y,z) with x, y, z > 0 and x + y + z = p were additionally
restricted by x ∈ {0,2,4,6,8,10,12,14} and y,z ∈ {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}. Of
these altogether 40 possible proposals (x,y,z) the dictator can select one. This
design forces X to prefer one dummy to the other, and excludes the equal split
between all three participants. Therefore, if dictators favor one dummy more
than the other, this should show up in our data, while indiﬀerence between
dummies should average out.
We distinguish three treatments:
• Treatment N (no communication): In the control treatment the dic-
tator X just chooses an allocation.
• Treatment V (visual communication): In this treatment, before de-
ciding about the allocation, the dictator sees a video of both dummies,
but cannot hear them.
4• Treatment AV (audio-visual communication): In the third treat-
ment, the dictator sees both dummies and hears one of them, namely Y ,
before allocating the pie.
The sessions took place in the video laboratory of the Max Planck Institute
in Jena, Germany.4 Participants were only female students of Jena University.
Out of about 650 registered female students a random draw of 332 subjects
was invited (dictators and dummies separately) using an Online Recruitment
System (Greiner, 2004).
Altogether we used the same 16 dummies for all treatments and 24 dictators,
8 for each treatment. Dummies were matched to pairs by the experimenters,
and dictators decided subsequently for all 8 dummy pairs in the same order.
After the experiment, in each treatment one dummy pair was randomly as-
signed to each dictator. Dictators were paid out according to their allocation
choice for this dummy pair. Dummies received the average of the selected allo-
cations in the three treatments. This design (including the existence of diﬀerent
treatments) was commonly known by all subjects.
The procedural design for our experiment is due to the nature of the eﬀects
and hypotheses we want to test. Note the following speciﬁc aspects:
• Their is no eﬃciency of dictator giving.5
• The ﬁxed order of dummy pair presentation to the dictator may cause
order eﬀects between dummy pairs.
• In forming pairs of dummies, we tried to (1) match equally attractive
dummies, and (2) to have at least one ”talking” dummy in treatment
AV in each pair. This procedure might bias comparisons of talking and
non-talking dummies, but should have no eﬀect on our other analysis.
• To avoid eﬀects of the video position, we altered the position of the talking
dummy AV in each round. Thus, in half of the dummy groups the talking
dummy’s screen was on the left resp. right side.
Upon arrival subjects were welcomed by an experimenter and each partici-
pant was led to one of the eight sound-proof booths. Each booth is equipped
with a computer, a computer screen, a video camera, a video screen and a
microphone. Dummies arrived and played in two cohorts of 8 subjects. They
4Instructions can be found in the appendix. Dummy group videos and transcripts can be
requested directly from the corresponding author.
5Due to the payoﬀ rules dummies are paid out the average of all three treatments. Dictators
thus reduce their own share by three Euros for each Euro actually given to a dummy.
5received the instructions which were (announced to be) the same for all treat-
ments and roles, and were told that they will be either in role Y or Z. After
reading their instructions they had 10 minutes to prepare their talk. Dummies
had to record their message twice. Each time, they had 2 minutes to speak
freely into the video camera. We imposed no restriction on what to say. Af-
ter recording both messages, dummies could decide which of the two messages
the experimenter should use for the remaining procedure (without having seen
them).
Figure 1: Example of the video screen with a dummy pair
The experimenters edited the recorded video messages according to the con-
ducted treatment. For this, we formed 8 dummy groups, which remained con-
stant for the rest of the experiment. On the next day, dictator participants
arrived and played in cohorts of 4 subjects. Dictators received the same in-
structions as the dummies. They were informed about their role and treatment,
i.e. whether or not they see the videos and hear one dummy. After the instruc-
tion phase, dictators played 8 rounds, one for each dummy pair. Each round
proceeded as follows:
• In treatments V and AV the prepared video was played, where the com-
munication was channelled according to treatment.
• The dictator chose the allocation (x,y,z) on a computer screen.
• Dictators then rated the dummies they saw. Ratings were elicited by
bipolar scales: active - passive and lively - dull, attractive - unattractive
and pleasant - unpleasant, strong - weak and inﬂuential - uninﬂuential
corresponding to the three factors of the semantic diﬀerential – activity,
evaluation, and potential (Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum, 1957). In the
control treatment N this step was left out.
6After playing all eight rounds, payoﬀs were calculated as described above.
The dictators were immediately paid in cash and left the laboratory whereas
dummies were paid later.6 The sessions lasted on average about 60 minutes for
dictators and 45 minutes for dummies. The average earnings per play were 15
Euros for dictators, 7.20 Euros for talking dummies Y and 6.80 Euros for the
non-talking dummies Z.7
3 Results
We ﬁrst describe the overall eﬀects of communication channels. Next, we review
the various ratings provided by dictators. We conclude with an analysis of the
dummies’ ways of arguing and allocations to the speciﬁc dummy pairs.
3.1 Communication channel eﬀects
The ﬁrst data column of Table 1 lists the average relative shares of the pie for all
treatments and roles. In Table 2, ﬁrst data column, results of Mann-Whitney-U
tests on overall treatment eﬀects are reported.
Dummy Group
All ∅σ2 · 102 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
N ∅x/p .71 .735 .65 .65 .72 .75 .68 .75 .72 .74
∅y/p .14 .387 .14 .16 .12 .11 .18 .12 .13 .13
∅z/p .16 .466 .21 .19 .16 .14 .15 .13 .15 .14
V ∅x/p .63 .338 .59 .65 .62 .62 .65 .65 .63 .68
∅y/p .18 .341 .18 .17 .18 .15 .16 .21 .24 .17
∅z/p .18 .324 .23 .18 .20 .23 .19 .15 .13 .15
AV ∅x/p .57 .895 .54 .60 .60 .53 .59 .51 .65 .54
∅y/p .23 .768 .23 .22 .18 .20 .21 .33 .21 .29
∅z/p .19 .587 .23 .18 .21 .27 .20 .15 .15 .17
Table 1: Average relative shares of x, y and z (and variances) in treatments N, V and
AV, overall and separated by dummy pairs
There are small but signiﬁcant eﬀects of the communication treatment on
dictator giving. Dictators’ average self-allocation x is signiﬁcantly lower in the
audio-visual treatment AV than in the baseline treatment N. The average self-
allocation in the video-only treatment V is between those in treatments AV and
N, but the diﬀerence is non-signiﬁcant in both cases.
6Dummy participants could collect their payments either at the institute’s oﬃce, the next
time they participated in an (other) experiment, or by meeting with the experimenters at a
speciﬁc time at the university.
7All numbers include a show-up fee of 4 Euros. Note that for dummies we list here the
average allocation for all three treatments.
7Allocations to the talking dummies in treatment AV are the highest across
treatments and dummy roles and signiﬁcantly exceed what dummies get in the
baseline treatment. Again, the allocations in treatment V do not diﬀer signiﬁ-
cantly from the allocations in the other treatments. Allocations to non-talking
dummies did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly across treatments. Thus, our results sup-
port the Social Communication Hypothesis, while the evidence for the Revealed
Anonymity Hypothesis is poor. When looking at dummy pairs, we ﬁnd that
13 out of the 16 dummies received more in treatment V than in the baseline.
When comparing treatments V and AV, 6 of the talking and 6 of the non-talking
dummies get more in the latter than in the former.8
Dummy Group






x - - - - - < - - - -
.064*
y - - - - - - - - - -







V x - > - - - - - < - <
.008*** .090* .060*
y - > - - - - - > - >
.025** .045** .029**







N x < - - - < < - < - <
.034** .044** .003*** .002*** .008***
y > > > - - - - > - >
.011** .013** .050** .000*** .000***
z - > - - - > - - - -
.085* .004***
V - - < - - < - > - -
y vs. z .094* .004*** .086*
AV - > - - - - - > - >
y vs. z .078* .004*** .004***
Table 2: Results (p-values) of one-sided Mann-Whitney-U tests comparing (variance
of) allocations to Dictator (x), Talking Dummy (y) and Non-Talking Dummy (z) in
treatments N, V , and AV , and of Wilcoxon Matched Pairs test comparing (variance
of) allocations to talking and non-talking dummies in treatment AV, for the average of
all dummy pairs and separately for each dummy pair. ’<’ and ’>’ show the direction
of the relation, ’-’ means non-signiﬁcant, *,**,*** indicates signiﬁcance on the 10%,
5%, 1% level, respectively.
8Unfortunately, we cannot use these numbers for statistical tests for reasons of dependency
of observations.
8We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant (Pearson) correlations between allocations and the
dummy groups order position, except for one negative correlation for non-
talking dummies in treatment AV (r=-.319, p=0.010). We consider this as
an outlier (due to the speciﬁcities in dummy groups 6 and 8 to be discussed
below) and conclude that there are no order eﬀects in our data.
How much do dictators discriminate between dummies? In 75% of all deci-
sions dictators chose a pie distribution with minimum payoﬀ diﬀerence between
the two dummies (i.e. a diﬀerence of 1 Euro). This tendency was prominent
in the treatments N and V (84.4% and 82.8% of all cases), but signiﬁcantly
lower in treatment AV (57.8%, Chi-Square test, two-tailed, p<0.01). Other-
wise, allocations to talking and non-talking dummies do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
in treatments V and AV (see Table 2, last two rows).
A measure of the dictators’ discrimination between dummy pairs is the vari-
ance of allocations between individual dummy groups. Data column 2 of Table 1
reports the average variance, non-parametric tests on variance diﬀerences be-
tween treatments are reported in column 2 of Table 2. Variance in allocations
is signiﬁcantly higher in treatment AV than in treatment V and (except for x)
in treatment N, while the latter two do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly. In treatment
AV, the variance in talking dummies’ shares is weakly signiﬁcantly higher than
for non-talking dummies.
3.2 Dictators’ Evaluations of Dummies
To validate the theoretical grouping into three psychological factors, a series
of principal-components analyses were computed on the dictators’ ratings of
dummies, for each treatment, and for each role in treatment AV. All factor
analyses yielded an identical factor solution with two factors: The ﬁrst factor
(Eigenvalues around 3.5) includes the scales corresponding to the ’potency’ and
’activity’ factors. The second factor (Eigenvalues exceeding 1.0) corresponds
to ’evaluation’. On these two factors, we ran the same statistics as for the
allocation choices. Table 3 lists the average ratings given to the dummies,
while Table 4 presents test results on treatment eﬀects and between-dummy
discrimination.
In treatment V, talking dummies were rated (weakly signiﬁcantly) higher
on the potency/activity factor, while non-talking dummies scored higher on
the evaluation factor. However, looking at the results on the dummy pair level
reveals quite some heterogeneity. In treatment AV, talking dummies Y were
perceived as more active/potent than the non-talking dummies Z, while there
was no diﬀerence in the evaluation ratings.
9Dummy Group
All ∅σ2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
V ∅Ey 0.56 4.39 -0.50 -0.88 1.25 1.88 -1.38 2.13 2.13 -0.13
∅Ez 1.41 5.88 3.00 -0.63 2.38 2.50 1.00 -0.63 3.13 0.50
∅PAy 0.70 26.72 3.00 -3.88 0.50 -2.75 -3.88 2.88 7.63 2.13
∅PAz -1.39 26.84 -1.50 -4.13 1.25 4.13 3.75 -8.00 -2.25 -4.38
AV ∅Ey 1.05 4.56 0.75 -0.63 0.13 1.88 -1.00 4.13 1.50 1.63
∅Ez 1.22 4.96 2.75 -1.50 2.38 3.75 0.13 -0.25 2.00 0.50
∅PAy 3.02 25.49 5.13 -3.25 -0.13 4.75 -2.75 7.38 9.00 4.00
∅PAz -2.00 33.56 -4.00 -5.38 0.50 4.25 5.38 -7.25 -3.63 -5.88
Table 3: Average (variance of) ratings for the evaluation (Ey,Ez in [−6,6]) and po-
tency/activity (PAy,PAz in [−12,12]) factors to talking dummy Y and non-talking
dummy Z in treatments V and AV, overall and separated by dummy pairs
Dummy Group







Ey - - - - - - - > - >
.017** .029**
Ez - - - - - - - - - -
PAy > - - - - > - > - -
.040** .017** .016**
PAz - - - - - - - - - -
V < - < - - - < > - -
Ey vs. Ez .008*** .016*** .078* .016**
V > - > - - < < > > >
PAy vs. PAz .082* .055* .004*** .008*** .004*** .004*** .031**
AV - - < - < < - > - >
Ey vs. Ez .094* .023** .031** .004*** .078*
AV > < > - - - < > > >
PAy vs. PAz .004*** .055* .004*** .008*** .004*** .004*** .004***
Table 4: Results (p-values) of one-sided Mann-Whitney-U tests comparing (variance
of) ratings of Talking Dummy (y) and Non-Talking Dummy (z) in treatments V and
AV , and of one-sided Wilcoxon Matched Pairs test comparing (variance of) ratings to
talking and non-talking dummies in treatment AV, for the average of all dummy pairs
and separately for each dummy pair. ’<’ and ’>’ show the direction of the relation,
’-’ means non-signiﬁcant, *,**,*** indicates signiﬁcance on the 10%, 5%, 1% level,
respectively.
Strong (Pearson) correlations were found between the dictators’ perception
of the dummies, as reﬂected in the ratings, and the share of the pie allocated
to them. The evaluation factor of a dummy was positively correlated with her
share of the pie, for both roles and both communication treatments (r=0.337,
p<0.001 in treatment V, r=0.473, p<0.001; r=0.597, p<0.001 for talking and
non-talking dummy, respectively, in treatment AV). The potency/activity fac-
tor was strongly correlated with both, the dummies’ shares and their evaluation
factors in treatment V (r=0.311, p<0.001 and r=0.360, p<0.001, respectively).
In treatment AV only the potency/activity ratings of the non-talking dum-
mies were correlated with their allocation share (r=0.359, p<0.005). Although
the ratings were correlated between the two dummies (only in treatment AV,
10r=0.304, p<0.05), one dummy’s allocation was not found to be correlated with
the other’s ratings.
To summarize, the social perception of a dummy by the dictator seems to
aﬀect her share. Since the ratings were obtained after the dictator’s alloca-
tion decision, we cannot exclude, however, that evaluations were driven by the
allocation decision, and not vice versa.
3.3 Dummies’ argumentation and pair speciﬁcity
Interestingly, most of the dummy subjects avoided appealing to the dictator.
In fact, 10 of the 16 dummies completely refrained from mentioning the game,
talking only about themselves, their hobbies, their last vacations, etc. Of the
remaining six dummies, one dummy merely described the rules, and two men-
tioned that they would prefer the dictator role (one of them became talking
dummy in pair 1). So only three dummies actually made any reference to pos-
sible pie distributions. Of those, one (talking dummy 4) just asked for money,
saying she needed it. Another one (talking dummy 6) somehow carefully re-
marked that sometimes outcomes of such experiments are not just, and that she
hoped this will not be the case here. She also mentioned that she was happy
not to be in the dictator role, as she is not good in making decisions under
time constraints. The last dummy (talking dummy 2) stated that she is curious
about the dictator’s decision, but that she herself always favors an even, fair
distribution. For these three pairs, the time spent on this content accounted
for less than 20 seconds of the 2 minutes.
Table 1 reports the average allocations to our 8 diﬀerent dummy groups. We
provide two measures of diﬀerences in allocations between dummy pairs: First,
Table 2 shows the results of tests on communication channel9 and discrimina-
tion; and second, Table 5 presents comparisons between allocations to dummy
pairs mentioning the allocation task, and the average allocations of the remain-
ing 4 dummy pairs where no reference to the game was made (further called
’the others’). All tests rely on the 8 dictators as independent observations.10
For dummy pairs 2, 5 and 7, we ﬁnd no treatment eﬀects in allocations at all
and therefore no support for any of our hypotheses. Especially, the argument
of talking dummy 2, that she would herself allocate the pie evenly, seems to
9Although dummies were anonymous in the baseline treatment, we still use the individual
pair’s allocations in our comparisons to control for order eﬀects.
10As a third measure, one may consider the non-parametric analysis of variance between
allocations to dummy groups in treatment AV using non-parametric matched pairs tests in a
round robin design, provided in Tables 7, 8 and 9 in the appendix. These results support the
conclusions drawn in this section.
11Wilcoxon p-values
Pair Distribution argument used ∅x/p ∅y/p ∅z/p for x for y for z
1 don’t want to be dictator .54 .23 .23 .002*** .471 .002***
2 prefers even distribution .60 .22 .18 .180 .449 .196
4 asking for money .53 .20 .27 .275 .054* .002***
6 sometimes outcomes are not just .51 .33 .15 .238 .025** .012**
other 4 no reference to game .60 .22 .18 - - -
Table 5: Average allocation shares to dummy pairs mentioning the allocation task
(as share of the pie) and one-sided Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Signed Ranks test results
of comparisons to average allocations to dummy pairs not talking about the game.
*,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance on the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
have no impact on dictators decisions (see Table 5). Table 6 shows that both,
the talking and non-talking dummy in dummy group 2, are rated lower on both
rating scales than dummies in groups where no reference to the game was made.
For pairs 1 and 3, the treatment eﬀects are only signiﬁcant for one variable
when comparing treatment AV with the baseline, and non-signiﬁcant for all
other comparisons. This, at best, provides weak support to the social com-
munication hypothesis. For dummy pair 1, dictators favored the non-talking
dummy in treatment V, and in treatment AV at their own expense in compari-
son with other dummy pairs. The talking dummy of pair 1 is perceived as more
potent/active and the non-talking dummy scored more on the evaluation scale,
when compared to other dummy pairs.
For pairs 6 and 8 self-allocations x in treatment AV are signiﬁcantly lower
than in N and V, while the latter two do not diﬀer. The reverse patterns
are observed for the allocation to the talking dummy. The talking dummies
in these groups get signiﬁcantly more than the non-talking dummies, whose
share did not diﬀer between treatments.11 Altogether, there is no evidence
for the Revealed Anonymity Hypothesis, but some support for the the Social
Communication explanation.
Dummy pair 4 is special: the non-talking dummy’s allocation is raised at
the expense of the dictator’s self-allocation x when she is seen by the dictator
in the video-only treatment V, and is higher than the talking dummy’s share.
This eﬀect is (non-signiﬁcantly) strengthened when adding the audio-channel
in treatment AV. The share of the talking dummy (who is asking for money
in her talk) does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between treatments, but is lower than
that of the talking dummies in dummy groups with no reference to the game,
11Talking dummy 6, who hopes that the results of the experiment will be fair, was quite
successful in increasing her income (compared to the other dummy groups), however, at the
expense of her non-talking dummy partner. But in dummy group 8 without referring to the
game nearly the same allocation results as well as ratings have been observed.
12while her partner is performing better than the rest. Surprisingly, in this pair
both, the talking and the non-talking dummy, are rated higher on both scales
than the dummies in other pairs.
Pair Distribution argument used Ey PAy Ez PAz
1 don’t want to be dictator 0.75 5.13* 2.75** -4.00
2 prefers even distribution -0.63*** -3.25*** -1.50*** -5.38**
4 asking for money 1.88* 4.75* 3.75** 4.25**
6 sometimes outcomes are not just 4.13*** 7.38*** -0.25*** -7.25***
other 4 no reference to game 0.56 2.53 1.25 -0.91
Table 6: Average ratings (Ey,Ez in [−6,6]), (PAy,PAz in [−12,12]) for dummy pairs
using special argumentations. *,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance on the 10%, 5%, 1% level,
respectively, of one-sided Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Signed Ranks tests of comparisons
to average evaluations for dummy pairs not talking about the game (as listed in last
row).
To sum up, the ratings for the speciﬁc dummy pairs show that preferences
between dummies are already existent in treatment V, but did not yet translate
to signiﬁcant payoﬀ discriminations. With the additional communication chan-
nel in treatment AV, talking dummies are rated higher at the potency/activity
scale, while ratings in evaluation were quite stable and even strengthened. Here,
this yielded more discrimination in dictator giving to the talking and the non-
talking dummy, but in both directions.
4 Discussion
Unilateral audio-visual communication in the three-person dictator game in-
spires generosity of dictators whereas pure visual exposure (including body
gestures, facial expressions, etc.) has no signiﬁcant eﬀect, at least according to
our data. Thus the Revealed Anonymity Hypothesis is not supported by our
data, which conﬁrms the conclusions of Brosig et al. (2003).
Variance in allocations seems to depend more on social evaluation of both
persons rather than on salient content of the dummy talk. In the ratings of
the dummies, discrimination is already existent in our video-only treatment V,
but usually does not aﬀect allocations. Thus, visual exposure suﬃces to induce
social processes and evaluation, but is not strong enough to cause action.
Adding the audio channel in treatment AV strengthens most ratings and
increases allocations to dummies, but in a discriminative way.12 Mostly just
one dummy gains, either at the expense of the dictator or the other dummy.
12Bolton, Katok and Zwick (1998) also observed that dictators who played sequentially with
10 diﬀerent, anonymous receivers allocated diﬀerent amounts to recipients.
13This supports the Social Communication Hypothesis and somewhat rejects the
Salient Considerations interpretation of unilateral communication.
Participants with no strategic power mostly avoid referring to the game
when given the unrestricted opportunity to speak to the only powerful player.13
Such dummy behavior is a reasonable tactic since it may be risky to raise
fairness issues. Discussing pie distribution and raising fairness issues in a self-
serving way may provoke the dictator to assume a self-serving attitude as well.
It thus may be better to appear as a friendly and congenial partner.
Overall, our experiment is a paradigm ruling out strategic considerations
but allowing for various communication channels. Inducing one-way communi-
cation, and using the same communicators in diﬀerent communication settings
allowed to study the social eﬀects of communication on altruistic dictator giv-
ing in great detail. We thereby have been able to reﬁne the Uncontrolled Social
Utility Hypothesis to a more controlled Social Communication Hypothesis.
13Schmidt and Zultan (2005) report that responders in an ultimatum experiment refer
to possible pie distributions and engage in threats and promises in their unilateral pre-play
communication.
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15A Non-parametric analysis of variance in dummy
pairs
To provide a non-parametric measure of variance between allocations in diﬀer-
ent dummy groups, we run one-sided Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Signed Ranks
tests in a complete round robin design for allocations in treatment AV. Results
are reported in Table 7 for dictators self-allocations, in Table 8 for allocations to
talking dummies, and in Table 9 for allocations to non-talking dummies. In each
cell of the tables, only signiﬁcant p-values are reported. ’<’ and ’>’ indicate
the direction of the relationship, from row to column, ’-’ means insigniﬁcant,











x6 < < < -
.51 .078* .078* .031**
x7 > > -
.65 .059* .020**
x8 < < -
.54 .063* .094*
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8
.54 .60 .60 .53 .59 .51 .65 .54











y6 > > > > > -
.33 .055* .023** .004*** .031** .023**
y7 < -
.21 .008***
y8 > > > > -
.29 .063* .016** .016** .055*
y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8
.23 .22 .18 .20 .21 .33 .21 .29











z6 < < < -
.15 .094* .094* .008***
z7 < < -
.15 .094* .023**
z8 < < -
.17 .063* .023**
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 z7 z8
.23 .18 .21 .27 .20 .15 .15 .17
Table 9: Variance of allocations to non-talking dummies
17B Experiment Instructions
(translated from German)
Welcome and many thanks for your participation in this experiment. Please
do not touch any of the equipment before we ask you to do so. If you
have problems with the equipment or other questions, please use the micro-
phone, or ask one of the experimenters. Please read the following instructions
carefully. Instructions are identical for every participant. You are able to earn
money during the experiment. The amount you earn depends on your own
decisions and the decisions of other participants of the experiment.
1. The experiment
The rules of the experiment are very simple. There are three Persons X,
Y and Z. There is a certain amount of money to distribute, which size is 17
Euros. In the experiment, Person X decides how she wants to divide the money.
When doing so she is restricted to some rules, which are described in section
2. Before Person X decides about the distribution, she watches a video tape,
which was recorded before with Persons Y and Z. Details about this are de-
scribed in section 3. Exactly as Person X proposed, the amount of money will
be distributed and paid out according to the rules in section 4. The procedure
of this experiment requires, that the participants in the roles of X, Y and Z
participate in the experiment at diﬀerent dates. Speciﬁcally, the participants Y
and Z are invited ﬁrst, while the participants in the role of Person X participate
in the experiment at a later date.
2. Rules for distribution
Person X is bound to the following rules for the distribution of the amount
of money:
a) The sum of allocations to the three persons must be 17 Euros.
b) Person Y and Z may only get either 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 Euros.
c) Person X may only get either 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, or 14 Euros.
Therefore, there are 40 distribution possibilities. These are listed in a table
at the end of these instructions.
3. Video recording
In the experiment, persons in the role of Y and Z will be given the oppor-
tunity to one-sidedly communicate to the person in the role of X. They have
1810 minutes to prepare for this. After the preparation time, participants in the
roles of Y and Z have two minutes to record a video message. During this time
Persons Y and Z are allowed to speak freely about everything, including the
experiment. Before her decision the videos of Person Y and Z are presented
to Person X. There are three possibilities: 1. Person X sees and hears none of
the two Persons Y and Z. 2. Person X sees Person Y as well as Person Z, but
cannot hear any of the two. 3. Person X sees Person Y as well as Person Z, but
can hear either only Person Y or only Person Z.
4. Calculations of payoﬀs
Every participant in the role of Y makes up a pair with exactly one partic-
ipant in the role of Z. The recorded video of this pair will be shown to exactly
24 diﬀerent participants in the role of X. Every Person X sees 8 diﬀerent pairs.
She decides for every pair which she sees about the distribution of the amount
of money. After the experiment one of the 8 pairs will be randomly selected for
each Person X. Then, Person X gets the amount which she allocated to herself.
Person Y and Z get the average of the amounts, which 3 persons in the role X
have allocated to them. Due to the experimental procedure, participants in the
role of Y and Z cannot be paid out immediately after the experiment, because
their speciﬁc payoﬀ can only be calculated after the participants in the role X
have participated in the experiment. To handle the payoﬀs, one experimenter
will be at the university at diﬀerent times in the following week. The speciﬁc
dates and locations will be sent early enough by e-mail. However, to pick up
your payoﬀ in cash you might come directly to the institute on every working
day in the same or the following week, from 9am to 4pm. Participants in the
role of X are paid out in cash immediately after the experiment.
If you have any questions regarding these instructions, please ask one of the
experimenters.
The 40 diﬀerent distribution possibilities
x 0 0 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4
y 9 8 9 8 7 6 9 8 7 6
z 8 9 6 7 8 9 4 5 6 7
x 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
y 5 4 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
z 8 9 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
x 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10 10
y 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 6 5
z 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2
x 10 10 10 10 12 12 12 12 14 14
y 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 2 1
z 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 1 2
19C Instructions for the Questionnaire
(translated from German)
In the following, we will ask you for your evaluation of the persons viewed.
Here it is described how to use the scales. In case you are not sure how to
ﬁll out the questionnaire have a look at this instruction again.
In case you ﬁnd a person to rate very similar to an attribute at the end of
the scale, then check one of the following boxes
active X o o o o o o passive
active o o o o o o X passive
In case you ﬁnd a person to rate quite similar to an attribute at the end of
the scale, then check one of the following boxes
active o X o o o o o passive
active o o o o o X o passive
In case you ﬁnd a person to rate lightly similar to an attribute at the end
of the scale (but not really neutral), then check one of the following boxes
active o o X o o o o passive
active o o o o X o o passive
Naturally, the horizontal direction of your cross depends on which of the
two attributes on the scale describes the person you are rating best.
When the person you are rating can be described neutral with regards to
the two attributes, that means that both attributes apply to the person alike,
you should mark the box in the middle.
active o o o X o o o passive
Please mark down whether you knew the person you are rating before.
Please mark whether you have just seen the person (e.g. at university) but not
known her personally, or whether you know your partner personally.
20